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A General Approach for Solving Differential Public Goods Games and a Comparison to the Static Case


Christian-Oliver Ewald


University of Glasgow; Center for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance
August 31, 2006


Abstract:     
We study a class of differential public good games and show how static public good games can naturally be embedded into this class. This allows us to compare the outcomes in the static and the dynamic case. In the dynamic case we study the feedback Nah-equilibria and compare these to the Nash equilibria of the corresponding static game. To solve for feedback the Nash equilibria in the dynamic case, we solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann equation by using the method of characteristic functions. Analytical results are given.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Public good games, differential games, optimal control

JEL Classification: C02;,C61, C73, D21, P51

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Date posted: January 19, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Ewald, Christian-Oliver, A General Approach for Solving Differential Public Goods Games and a Comparison to the Static Case (August 31, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=958009 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.958009

Contact Information

Christian-Oliver Ewald (Contact Author)
University of Glasgow ( email )
Adam Smith Building
Glasgow, Scotland G12 8RT
United Kingdom
Center for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )
Castlecliffe
The Scores
St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL
United Kingdom
+44(0)1334 462435 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au/u/ewald/
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