Law as a Species of Language Acquisition
James Ming Chen
Michigan State University - College of Law
Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 73, p. 1273, 1995
This article addresses two questions. First, it asks what law can learn from linguistics. Second, it asks what linguistics might tell us about the way we learn law.
Scholarship on law and linguistics has focused so far on matters of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics - the essentials of meaning, sentence structure, and noncontextual aspects of language. The next wave of scholarship on law and linguistics should focus on finding the most fruitful level of scientific specificity. Most errors by lawyers as amateur linguists can be traced to the assumption that language is a static mechanism rather than a living organism. Instead of focusing on incomplete translation metaphors, this article asks how ordinary humans master any language, not merely the specialized language of the law. By comparing theories of childhood language acquisition with law and its interpretive process, this article seeks nothing less than the legal equivalent of Noam Chomsky's universal grammar - what Lon Fuller described as the morality that makes law possible.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: linguistics, syntax, language acquisition, Chomsky, Fuller, Scalia, Solan, statutory interpretation, statutesAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 23, 2007
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