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http://ssrn.com/abstract=959060
 
 

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Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency


Pingyang Gao


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

August 2007


Abstract:     
This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes (1936) and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). In such markets, public information plays an additional coordination role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drives stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian beauty contest effect.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Short Horizons, Keynesian Beauty Contest, Rational Expectations, Price Efficiency, Disclosure, Social Welfare, Information

JEL Classification: M41, M45, G38, D82

working papers series





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Date posted: March 1, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Gao, Pingyang, Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency (August 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.959060

Contact Information

Pingyang Gao (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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