Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design
World Bank - Financial and Private Sector Development; World Bank
Edward J. Kane
Boston College - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); International Monetary Fund (IMF)
NBER Working Paper No. w12862
This paper identifies factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a comprehensive dataset covering 180 countries during the 1960-2003 period. Our analysis focuses on how private interest-group pressures, outside influences, and political-institutional factors affect deposit-insurance adoption and design. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks, quality of bank regulations, and institutional development, we find that both private and public interests, as well as outside influences to emulate developed-country regulatory schemes, can explain the timing of adoption decisions and the rigor of loss-control arrangements. Controlling for other factors, political systems that facilitate intersectoral power sharing dispose a country toward design features that accommodate risk-shifting by banks.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Date posted: January 24, 2007
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.454 seconds