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http://ssrn.com/abstract=959696
 
 

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The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks


Christopher Avery


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christine Jolls


Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard A. Posner


University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alvin E. Roth


HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 122
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 345

Abstract:     
In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school, for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast, judges are exhorted to follow a set of start dates for considering and hiring applicants during the fall of the third year of law school. Using the same general methodology as we employed in a study of the market for federal judicial law clerks conducted in 1998-2000, we have broadly surveyed both federal appellate judges and law students about their experiences of the new market for law clerks. This Article analyzes our findings within the prevailing economic framework for studying markets with tendencies toward early hiring - a framework we both draw upon and modify in the course of our analysis. Our data make clear that the movement of the clerkship market back to the third year of law school is highly valued by judges, but we also find that a strong majority of the judges responding to our surveys has concluded that non-adherence to the specified start dates is very substantial - a conclusion we are able to corroborate with specific quantitative data from both judge and student surveys. The consistent experience of a wide range of other markets suggests that such non-adherence in the law clerk market will lead to either a reversion to very early hiring or the use of a centralized matching system such as that used for medical residencies. We suggest, however, potential avenues by which the clerkship market could stabilize at something like its present pattern of mixed adherence and non-adherence, thereby avoiding the complete abandonment of the current system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Judicial clerkships, judges

JEL Classification: J41, J44, J48

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Date posted: January 31, 2007 ; Last revised: December 9, 2012

Suggested Citation

Avery, Christopher and Jolls, Christine and Posner, Richard A. and Roth, Alvin E., The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks. University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming; Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 122; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 345. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959696

Contact Information

Christopher Avery
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4063 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Christine Jolls (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
203.432.1958 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Richard A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
LBQ 611
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9608 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alvin E. Roth
HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-5447 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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