Markets as Regulators: A Survey
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
Howell E. Jackson
Harvard Law School
June 1, 2007
Southern California Law Review, Vol. 80, p. 1239, 2007
In this paper we explore the allocation of regulatory responsibilities to market infrastructure institutions, administrative agencies and central government entities in the eight most influential jurisdictions for securities regulation in the world. After reviewing the academic literature on the role of self-regulatory organizations in the oversight of modern stock exchanges, we report the results of a survey of the allocation of regulatory powers in a sample of eight key jurisdictions. In that survey, we examine the allocation of such powers in three levels: rulemaking, monitoring of compliance with these rules, and enforcement of rules violations. Based on our findings, we categorize these jurisdictions in three distinct models of allocation of regulatory powers: a Government-led Model, that preserves significant authority for central government control over securities markets regulation albeit with a relatively limited enforcement apparatus (France, Germany, Japan); a Flexibility Model, that grants significant leeway to market participants in performing their regulatory obligations but relies on government agencies to set general policies and maintain some enforcement capacity (UK, Hong Kong, Australia); and a Cooperation Model that assigns a broad range of power to market participants in almost all aspects of securities regulation but also maintains strong and overlapping oversight of market activity through well-endowed governmental agencies with more robust enforcement traditions (US, Canada).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 144
JEL Classification: G28, K22, K23
Date posted: January 31, 2007 ; Last revised: January 28, 2009
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