Strategic Voting Over Strategic Proposals
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
Johns Hopkins University
Prior research on "strategic voting" has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off, even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.
Note: An updated version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=976897
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: Strategic voting, agenda setting, multilateral bargaining
JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8working papers series
Date posted: February 5, 2007
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