Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=962131
 
 

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Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation


Michael R. Roberts


The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amir Sufi


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER

August 11, 2008

9th Annual Texas Finance Festival
AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings

Abstract:     
We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

Keywords: Capital Structure, Financial Policy, Debt, Control Rights, Optimal Contracting

JEL Classification: G32, G21, G31

working papers series





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Date posted: February 12, 2007 ; Last revised: December 13, 2011

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Michael R. and Sufi, Amir, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation (August 11, 2008). 9th Annual Texas Finance Festival; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.962131

Contact Information

Michael R. Roberts (Contact Author)
The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
3620 Locust Walk, #2320
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
(215) 573-9780 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/
Amir Sufi
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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