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Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation
Ronald W. Masulis Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - School of Law Brett Trueman University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1998 Abstract: This paper explores implications of differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthermore, dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies under internal financing. The profitability of internally-financed security investment is shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, externally-financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint.
Keywords: Dividends, Investment, Personal Taxation, Corporate Taxation, Internal Financing, External Financing, Tax Brackets, Taxes, Shareholder Conflicts of Interest JEL Classifications: D23, G31, G35, H23, H24, H25 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: February 12, 2007 ; Last revised: February 12, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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