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Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation

Ronald W. Masulis
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - School of Law

Brett Trueman
University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management



Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1998

Abstract:     
This paper explores implications of differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthermore, dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies under internal financing. The profitability of internally-financed security investment is shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, externally-financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint.

Keywords: Dividends, Investment, Personal Taxation, Corporate Taxation, Internal Financing, External Financing, Tax Brackets, Taxes, Shareholder Conflicts of Interest

JEL Classifications: D23, G31, G35, H23, H24, H25

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: February 12, 2007 ; Last revised: February 12, 2007

Suggested Citation

Trueman, Brett and Masulis, Ronald W., Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962143


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Contact Information

Ronald W. Masulis (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-3687 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)
Vanderbilt University - School of Law
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
Brett Trueman
University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management ( email )
110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-4720 (Phone)
310-267-2193 (Fax)
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