The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability
University of Saskatchewan
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), No. 32, No. 2, 2007
From an economic perspective, conventional fiduciary liability for self-dealing appears to raise little controversy. The accepted function of the duty of loyalty is to control opportunism in limited access arrangements. That legal duty is complemented by a variety of economic mechanisms that indirectly or incidentally perform the same function. Unfortunately, the conventional function is partially obscured by a number of conceptual confusions in the economic and legal literature. A review of the literature exposes the analytical misdirection and confirms the utility of the conventional proscription on self-interest.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: Delaware, Journal, Corporate, Law, Economics, Fiduciary, Accountability, LiabilityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 15, 2007
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