Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=963347
 
 

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Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor Protection


Luca Enriques


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Martin Gelter


Fordham University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds., pp. 421-457, 2008

Abstract:     
The European framework for creditor protection has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years. While the ECJ's Centros case and its progeny have introduced free choice with respect to the State of incorporation, and hence the substantive company law regime, the European Insolvency Regulation has implemented uniform conflict of laws rules for insolvencies. However, this regime has opened up some forum shopping opportunities. This article analyzes possible consequences of regulatory competition and forum shopping for creditors and argues that the "insolvencification" of corporate law creditor protection mechanisms will not enable national policymakers to impose their respective ideas about creditor protection on firms in a fully-fledged manner.

Keywords: regulatory competition, creditor protection, EC company law, European Insolvency Regulation, forum shopping

JEL Classification: K20

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 19, 2007 ; Last revised: June 2, 2008

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca and Gelter, Martin, Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor Protection. European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006 ; THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds., pp. 421-457, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963347

Contact Information

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Martin Gelter
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
646-312-8752 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/10929.htm
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=621
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