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Antitrust and Regulation

Dennis W. Carlton

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Randal C. Picker

University of Chicago - Law School

February 2007

NBER Working Paper No. w12902

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

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Date posted: February 17, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Carlton , Dennis W. and Picker, Randal C., Antitrust and Regulation (February 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w12902. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963735

Contact Information

Dennis W. Carlton (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Randal C. Picker
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0864 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/
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References:  55
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