Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=964699
 
 

Citations (2)



 
 

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Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering


Steven L. Schwarcz


Duke University - School of Law


Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Vol. 12, Spring 2007
Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 108

Abstract:     
This article attempts to explain empirically the value that lawyers add when acting as counsel to parties in business transactions. Contrary to existing scholarship, which is based mostly on theory, this article shows that transactional lawyers add value primarily by reducing regulatory costs, thereby challenging the reigning models of transactional lawyers as "transaction cost engineers" and "reputational intermediaries." This new model not only helps inform contract theory but also reveals a profoundly different vision than those of existing models for the future of legal education and the profession.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

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Date posted: February 25, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering. Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Vol. 12, Spring 2007; Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 108. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=964699

Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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