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Reforms in Business Regulation: Evidence from Russia

Evgeny Yakovlev
University of California, Berkeley

Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya
New Economic School; Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


March 14, 2008


Abstract:     
What determines the enforcement of reform of business regulation? What are the outcomes of such reform? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of regulatory reform on net entry into the official sector and small business employment and no effect on pollution and public health. The results support public choice theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with the predictions of public interest theory.

Keywords: Regulation, deregulation reform, business entry

JEL Classifications: H10, K20, L50

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 28, 2007 ; Last revised: March 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Yakovlev, Evgeny and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., Reforms in Business Regulation: Evidence from Russia (March 14, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=965838


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Contact Information

Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
117418 117418
Russia
Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow Russia
+7 49 5134 0426 (Phone)
+7 49 5129 3722 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Evgeny Yakovlev
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
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