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Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement ContractsEitan GoldmanIndiana University Bloomington - Department of Finance Jongil Soaffiliation not provided to SSRN Jörg RochollESMT European School of Management and Technology September 9, 2012 Forthcoming Review of Finance Abstract: This paper analyzes whether political connections of the boards of directors of publicly traded companies in the United States affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to U.S. companies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: Politics, Corporate Governance, Boards, Procurement Contracts JEL Classification: D21, G14, G30, H20, H57 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: March 25, 2008 ; Last revised: September 13, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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