Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=965888
 
 

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Citations (7)



 


 



Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts


Eitan Goldman


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Jongil So


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jörg Rocholl


ESMT European School of Management and Technology

September 9, 2012

Forthcoming Review of Finance

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes whether political connections of the boards of directors of publicly traded companies in the United States affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to U.S. companies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Politics, Corporate Governance, Boards, Procurement Contracts

JEL Classification: D21, G14, G30, H20, H57

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Date posted: March 25, 2008 ; Last revised: May 12, 2014

Suggested Citation

Goldman, Eitan and So, Jongil and Rocholl, Jörg, Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts (September 9, 2012). Forthcoming Review of Finance. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=965888 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965888

Contact Information

Eitan Goldman (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-856-0749 (Phone)

Jongil So
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Joerg Rocholl
ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )
Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244
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