Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
affiliation not provided to SSRN
ESMT European School of Management and Technology
September 9, 2012
Forthcoming Review of Finance
This paper analyzes whether political connections of the boards of directors of publicly traded companies in the United States affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to U.S. companies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Politics, Corporate Governance, Boards, Procurement Contracts
JEL Classification: D21, G14, G30, H20, H57
Date posted: March 25, 2008 ; Last revised: May 12, 2014
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.516 seconds