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Origin and Concentration: Corporate Ownership, Control and Performance in Firms after Privatization


Jan Hanousek


CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Evzen Kocenda


Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute); CESifo; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute; Osteuropa Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jan Svejnar


University of Michigan - Stephen M. Ross School of Business; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


Economics of Transition, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-31, January 2007

Abstract:     
We analyse the effects of different types and concentration of ownership on performance using a large population of firms in the Czech Republic after mass privatization. Specifications based on first-differences combined with instrumental variables show that the performance effects of different types and concentration of ownership are limited when compared to earlier studies. Often, concentrated ownership has a positive effect, a finding that supports the agency theory. The positive effect of foreign ownership is detected primarily for majority ownership and for ownership by foreign industrial firms. The state as a holder of the golden share has a positive effect on employment and sometimes, also on output and profitability. Overall, our results highlight the benefits of strategic restructuring accompanied by an inflow of new capital and managerial culture.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 20, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Hanousek, Jan, Kocenda, Evzen and Svejnar, Jan, Origin and Concentration: Corporate Ownership, Control and Performance in Firms after Privatization. Economics of Transition, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-31, January 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=965908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00278.x

Contact Information

Jan Hanousek (Contact Author)
CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )
Politickych veznu 7
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic
420 2 2400 5119 (Phone)
420 2 2421 1374 (Fax)
Evzen Kocenda
Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )
P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic
+420 224005149 (Phone)
+420 22427143 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://home.cerge-ei.cz/kocenda/index.htm
CESifo
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute
724 E. University Ave.
Wyly Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
Osteuropa Institut
Landshuter Str. 4
93047 Regensburg
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Jan Svejnar
University of Michigan - Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-936-5042 (Phone)
734-936-8715 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~svejnar
Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)
P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
111 21 Prague 1, Prague
Czech Republic
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  56
Citations:  17

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