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Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch as a Result of Inefficient Financial Intermediation--with Reference to the Asian Financial Crisis

Jorge A. Chan-Lau
International Monetary Fund; The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Zhaohui Chen
International Monetary Fund (IMF)


August 1998

IMF Working Paper No. 98/127

Abstract:     
This paper develops a model of private debt financing under inefficient financial intermediation. It suggests a mechanism that can generate the following sequence of events observed in the recent Asian crisis: A period of relatively low capital flow despite a steady improvement in economic fundamentals (capital inflow inertia), followed by a fast buildup of capital inflow, and ended with a large capital outflow and domestic credit crunch. Unlike other models requiring large movements in fundamentals or asset prices to explain a financial crisis, this model can exhibit large credit/capital flow swings with moderate changes in the economic and market environment.

Keywords: Financial crisis, Asian crisis, credit crunch, financial intermediary, capital flow, capital inflow inertia

JEL Classifications: E44, F34, G21

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 17, 1998 ; Last revised: August 09, 2006

Suggested Citation

Chan-Lau, Jorge A. and Chen, Zhaohui, Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch as a Result of Inefficient Financial Intermediation--with Reference to the Asian Financial Crisis (August 1998). IMF Working Paper No. 98/127. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=96622 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.96622


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Contact Information

Jorge Antonio Chan-Lau (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund ( email )
700 19th St NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
(202) 623-4271 (Phone)
(202) 589-4271 (Fax)
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )
160 Packard Ave
Medford, MA 02155
United States
HOME PAGE: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ceme/index.shtml
Zhaohui Chen
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-6480 (Phone)
202-623-4740 (Fax)
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