SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise

Peter S. Menell
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

David Nimmer
Irell & Manella LLP


February 28, 2007

UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 966380

Abstract:     
The Supreme Court's indirect copyright liability standard, derived in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios from patent law and reasserted in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., is widely seen as creating a safe harbor for distributors of dual use technologies. Yet, when one looks to cases decided since Sony, legislative enactments, and the decisions of technology companies in the marketplace, a very different reality emerges. This article explores and explains the broad gulf between the idealized (and idolized) Sony safe harbor and the practical reality. It shows that the law in many respects reflects the tort principles that undergird copyright liability more generally.

Keywords: Copyright, Contributory Liability, Indirect Liability

JEL Classifications: O34, Z10, K30

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 01, 2007 ; Last revised: October 06, 2009

Suggested Citation

Menell, Peter S. and Nimmer, David, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise (February 28, 2007). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 966380. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=966380


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Peter S. Menell (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
David Nimmer
Irell & Manella LLP ( email )
1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
Los Angeles, CA 90067
United States
310-277-1010 or (310) 203-7079 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 650
Downloads: 186
Download Rank: 45,912

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo 4 in 0.281 seconds.