Bargaining Efficiency and Screening: An Experimental Investigation
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
Economics Working Paper 284
This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial for these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
JEL Classification: J52, C91, C78working papers series
Date posted: June 28, 1998
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.610 seconds