Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=966666
 


 



A Modest Enterprise


Reza Dibadj


University of San Francisco - School of Law


Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 10, p. 415, 2006

Abstract:     
This article discusses The Antitrust Enterprise by Herbert Hovenkamp. While generally praising the book for its refreshing style, its recognition of antitrust's institutional limits, and its efforts to simplify antitrust doctrine, the article ultimately criticizes it as unnecessarily wedded to neoclassical economics. The piece discusses similarities between Hovenkamp's ideas and Chicago school economics, as well as Hovenkamp's apparent skepticism of post-Chicago thinking. Ultimately, the article calls for a more dramatic reimagination of antitrust's role, arguing that neoclassical economics should not be the frontline arbiter of competition policy. Instead, the author urges returning antitrust to its former prominence through the use of distributional and deontological goals, post-Chicago economic methods, and a willingness to contemplate antitrust and regulation as holistic bodies of law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: antitrust, law & economics

JEL Classification: K21, L40, K00

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Date posted: March 2, 2007 ; Last revised: February 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Dibadj, Reza, A Modest Enterprise. Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 10, p. 415, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=966666

Contact Information

Reza Dibadj (Contact Author)
University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )
2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States
415-422-5253 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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