Economics of Pupillage

Rupert Macey-Dare

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College; Middle Temple; Minerva Chambers


This paper explores the economics of pupillage and shows why the imposition of minimum pupillage funding significantly reduces the annual supply of pupillages and skews the choice of pupils chosen towards more privileged candidates. The paper estimates the likely knock-on effects of minimum pupillage funding, in terms of reduced population of practicing barristers, increased barristers' fees and reduced public welfare.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, legal training, professional vocational training, price-fixing, social welfare costs, protectionism, discrimination, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: March 3, 2007 ; Last revised: January 26, 2011

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Pupillage (2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=967619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967619

Contact Information

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Saint Cross College ( email )
Saint Giles
United Kingdom
Middle Temple
Middle Temple Lane
London, EC4Y 9AT
United Kingdom
Minerva Chambers
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,002
Downloads: 245
Download Rank: 82,035

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.297 seconds