Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=967619
 


 



Economics of Pupillage


Rupert Macey-Dare


University of Oxford - Saint Cross College

2007


Abstract:     
This paper explores the economics of pupillage and shows why the imposition of minimum pupillage funding significantly reduces the annual supply of pupillages and skews the choice of pupils chosen towards more privileged candidates. The paper estimates the likely knock-on effects of minimum pupillage funding, in terms of reduced population of practicing barristers, increased barristers' fees and reduced public welfare.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, legal training, professional vocational training, price-fixing, social welfare costs, protectionism, discrimination, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

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Date posted: March 3, 2007 ; Last revised: January 26, 2011

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Pupillage (2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=967619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967619

Contact Information

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Saint Cross College ( email )
Saint Giles
Oxford
United Kingdom
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