Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=968141
 
 

References (48)



 
 

Citations (25)



 


 



Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value


Franklin Allen


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Elena Carletti


Bocconi University - Department of Finance; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Robert Marquez


University of California, Davis

September 16, 2009

EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 190/2007
Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper #09-28

Abstract:     
In countries such as Germany, the legal system ensures that firms are stakeholder oriented. In others, like Japan, social norms achieve a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. The results have interesting implications for the political economy of foreign entry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Firm objective, co-determination, imperfect competition

JEL Classification: G34, G38, L11

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 5, 2007 ; Last revised: October 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Allen, Franklin and Carletti, Elena and Marquez, Robert, Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (September 16, 2009). EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 190/2007; Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper #09-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968141

Contact Information

Franklin Allen (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-3629 (Phone)
215-573-2207 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~allenf/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Elena Carletti
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )
Via dei Roccettini 9
via delle Fontanelle 10
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence 50014
Italy
Robert S. Marquez
University of California, Davis ( email )
One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,295
Downloads: 1,894
Download Rank: 3,921
References:  48
Citations:  25
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.453 seconds