Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=968670
 
 

References (31)



 


 



The Market for Comeback CEOs


Rüdiger Fahlenbrach


Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Bernadette A. Minton


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance

Carrie H. Pan


Santa Clara University - Department of Finance

February 2007

AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
We study the determinants and valuation consequences of rehiring a former CEO. Rehiring is more likely after poor performance of the current CEO, if the former CEO performed well during his prior tenure and maintains strong connections to the firm, and the more intangible are the firm's assets. While the market reacts negatively to the rehiring announcement, the accounting and stock market performances of rehired CEO firms do not differ from those of a control sample over the two years following the turnover. Our evidence suggests that firms rehiring their former CEOs hire the best available candidate given the circumstances.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: CEO turnover, boomerang CEO, managerial effects, entrenchment

JEL Classification: G14, G34

working papers series





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Date posted: March 9, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Minton, Bernadette A. and Pan, Carrie H., The Market for Comeback CEOs (February 2007). AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968670

Contact Information

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
Extranef 211
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
++41-21-693-0098 (Phone)
++41-21-693-3010 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/fahlenbrach.html
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

Bernadette A. Minton (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
614-688-3125 (Phone)
614-292-2359 (Fax)

Carrie H. Pan
Santa Clara University - Department of Finance ( email )
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
(408)5517188 (Phone)
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References:  31

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