Economics of Deferral of Call

Macey-Dare, Rupert

doi:10.2139/ssrn.969817

Abstract

Download This Paper | Share | Email |Add to Briefcase

Economics of Deferral of Call

Rupert Macey-Dare

St. Cross College, Oxford

Spring 2007

Abstract:
This paper uses economic analysis to identify likely winners and losers and to consider how the structure of education and training for the Bar of England and Wales would change, if proposals for deferral of Call to the Bar until after the end of pupillage were ever implemented.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, deferral of call, Inns of Court, legal education, professional vocational training, BVC, discrimination, protectionism, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: March 21, 2007 ; Last revised: April 26, 2008

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Deferral of Call (Spring 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=969817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.969817

Contact Information

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)

St. Cross College, Oxford ( email )

Saint Giles
Oxford
United Kingdom