Economics of Deferral of Call

Rupert Macey-Dare

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP

Spring 2007

This paper uses economic analysis to identify likely winners and losers and to consider how the structure of education and training for the Bar of England and Wales would change, if proposals for deferral of Call to the Bar until after the end of pupillage were ever implemented.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, deferral of call, Inns of Court, legal education, professional vocational training, BVC, discrimination, protectionism, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: March 21, 2007 ; Last revised: April 26, 2008

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Deferral of Call (Spring 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=969817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.969817

Contact Information

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Saint Cross College ( email )
Saint Giles
United Kingdom
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP ( email )
65 Fleet Street
London EC4Y 1HS
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 791
Downloads: 91
Download Rank: 177,601

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.313 seconds