Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=969823
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?


Rüdiger Fahlenbrach


Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Bernadette A. Minton


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance

Carrie H. Pan


Santa Clara University - Department of Finance

August 22, 2010

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2007-03-004
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2007-4
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 10-11

Abstract:     
We investigate corporate governance experts’ claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit on average from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: CEO turnover, rehired CEO, former CEO, relative performance evaluation

JEL Classification: G14, G34

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: March 19, 2007 ; Last revised: September 27, 2010

Suggested Citation

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Minton, Bernadette A. and Pan, Carrie H., Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources? (August 22, 2010). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming; Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2007-03-004; Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2007-4; Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 10-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=969823

Contact Information

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach (Contact Author)
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
Extranef 211
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
++41-21-693-0098 (Phone)
++41-21-693-3010 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/fahlenbrach.html
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

Bernadette A. Minton
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
614-688-3125 (Phone)
614-292-2359 (Fax)

Carrie H. Pan
Santa Clara University - Department of Finance ( email )
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
(408)5517188 (Phone)
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