Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=969852
 
 

References (37)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Dynamic Kidney Exchange


M. Utku Ünver


Boston College - Department of Economics

March 11, 2007

Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We find the dynamically optimal two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programs were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange is a special instance of our more general model, dynamically optimal kidney exchange mechanisms are characterized as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Dynamic exchange, barter exchange, kidney exchange, matching, market design, dynamic optimization, Markov process

JEL Classification: C78, C70, D78, C61

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 11, 2007 ; Last revised: December 17, 2009

Suggested Citation

Ünver, M. Utku, Dynamic Kidney Exchange (March 11, 2007). Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=969852

Contact Information

Utku Unver (Contact Author)
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,035
Downloads: 604
Download Rank: 23,882
References:  37
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.313 seconds