Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=970355
 
 

References (49)



 
 

Citations (13)



 


 



Corporate Governance Consequences of Accounting Scandals: Evidence from Top Management, CFO and Auditor Turnover


Anup Agrawal


University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration

Tommy Cooper


University of Mississippi

October 2007

2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
This paper examines the consequences of accounting scandals to top management, top financial officers, and outside auditors. We examine a sample of 518 U.S. public companies that announced earnings-decreasing restatements during the 1997-2002 period and an industry-size matched sample of control firms. Using logistic regressions that control for other determinants of management turnover, we find strong evidence of greater turnover of CEOs, top management and CFOs of restating firms compared to the control sample. The magnitudes of these effects are even larger for restatements that are more serious, have worse effects on stock prices, or result in negative restated earnings. We find no consistent evidence that auditor turnover is higher in restating firms, except for restatements initiated by the company. Our paper provides evidence of effective functioning of internal governance mechanisms following accounting scandals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Management turnover, CFO turnover, Auditor turnover, Accounting scandals, Earnings manipulation, Earnings restatements, Financial restatements

JEL Classification: G34, M43, K22

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 5, 2008 ; Last revised: March 17, 2008

Suggested Citation

Agrawal, Anup and Cooper, Tommy, Corporate Governance Consequences of Accounting Scandals: Evidence from Top Management, CFO and Auditor Turnover (October 2007). 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper; AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.970355

Contact Information

Anup Agrawal (Contact Author)
University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration ( email )
Culverhouse College of Business
EFLS, Box 870224
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0223
United States
205-348-8970 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://old.cba.ua.edu/personnel/AnupAgrawal.html
Tommy Cooper
University of Mississippi ( email )
PO Box 3986
Oxford, MS 38677
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,584
Downloads: 1,826
Download Rank: 4,142
References:  49
Citations:  13

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.329 seconds