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Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt


Adam Feibelman


Tulane University - Law School


North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 85, p. 727, 2007
UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 970661

Abstract:     
This Article proposes that sovereign nations and their creditors adopt a contractual approach to the seemingly intractable problem of odious debt. Odious debt is generally defined as an obligation incurred by a despotic or illegitimate leader that provides no value to the population of the sovereign. In recent years, spurred primarily by the financial problems of post-Hussein Iraq, many writers and commentators have proposed doctrinal and institutional mechanisms that would provide odious debt relief. These proposals all face practical challenges, and they would likely involve significant risk of destabilizing financial markets. Under a contractual approach, a majority or supermajority of a sovereign's creditors would have the power to identify odious obligations of the sovereign. The sovereign would then be obligated to repudiate these debts. Creditors should have good incentives to employ this arrangement discriminately. More than any other relevant actors, creditors will internalize the costs and benefits of odious debt relief. Even if the private benefits of contractual odious debt arrangements are modest, they might create significant positive externalities. If so, academics, official actors, and policy advocates should encourage sovereigns and their creditors to adopt such arrangements.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: contracts, sovereign debt, odious debt

JEL Classification: F35, H69, K13

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Date posted: March 16, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Feibelman, Adam, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt. North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 85, p. 727, 2007; UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 970661. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970661

Contact Information

Adam Feibelman (Contact Author)
Tulane University - Law School ( email )
6329 Freret Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
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