Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=970802
 
 

Footnotes (16)



 


 



University of Florida Study Shows Only Winners from Network Neutrality Regulation to Be Content Providers, Consumers Lose


George S. Ford


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

March 14, 2007


Abstract:     
This month, three professors at the University of Florida's Warrington College of Business Administration released a new paper on the effects of network neutrality regulation using a stylized game-theoretic model (the "Florida Study"). This analytical investigation of network neutrality is certainly a welcome addition to the debate, which has primarily been driven by emotion. But the conclusions of the Florida Study have been grossly misconstrued by network neutrality proponents, who have seized upon them in claiming that the study shows that the "Internet with Net Neutrality is unequivocally better for consumers." Even a casual read of the Florida Study shows that those claims are entirely false. In fact, the Florida Study clearly shows that under no circumstances will consumer welfare be improved by network neutrality regulation. In fact, the Florida Study suggests that the only "winners" from network neutrality regulation will be the Internet content providers - with broadband service providers and consumers being worse off (or, in some cases, unaffected). Policymakers should therefore not be misled as to what the Florida Study actually says and should pay heed to the warnings that lie beneath the patina of overzealous advocacy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: Network Neutrality, University of Florida, Cheng

JEL Classification: K20, K23, L14, L22, L50, L51, L96, L98

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 16, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Ford, George S., University of Florida Study Shows Only Winners from Network Neutrality Regulation to Be Content Providers, Consumers Lose (March 14, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.970802

Contact Information

George S. Ford (Contact Author)
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 602
Downloads: 125
Download Rank: 136,952
Footnotes:  16

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.328 seconds