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Liability for Failure to Regulate Health and Safety Risk - Second-Guessing Policy Choice or Showing Judicial Restraint?


Willem H. Van Boom


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Durham Law School

Andrea Pinna


Bredin Prat

2006

European Tort Law 2005 (Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook), pp. 1-21, 2006

Abstract:     
Can the State be held liable in tort for failure to enact protective legislation preventing the spread of a contagious disease? Can a regulatory agency responsible for occupational health and safety be held liable for not safeguarding employees from being exposed to a specific noxious substance? Are civil courts the appropriate forum to evaluate legislative policy in this respect? Or should they abstain from second-guessing public policy and leave these issues to politics?

These are difficult questions on the intersection between tort law, regulatory law, constitutional law and administrative law. In this paper, we identify some of the arguments used in the European legal debate in favour of and against judicial activism concerning liability for failure to regulate. We argue that in European tort law systems there is more space for this type of State liability than one would initially expect.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: state liability, regulatory failure, administrative tort, European tort law

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Date posted: March 14, 2007 ; Last revised: November 4, 2009

Suggested Citation

Van Boom, Willem H. and Pinna, Andrea, Liability for Failure to Regulate Health and Safety Risk - Second-Guessing Policy Choice or Showing Judicial Restraint? (2006). European Tort Law 2005 (Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook), pp. 1-21, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970959

Contact Information

Willem H. Van Boom (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Durham Law School ( email )
50 North Bailey
Durham, DH1 3ET
United Kingdom
Andrea Pinna
Bredin Prat ( email )
130, rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré
Paris, 75008
France
+33144353535 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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