|
||||
|
||||
Rounding as Discrimination - Price Clustering in the OTC Tax-Exempt Bond MarketDan LiFederal Reserve Board November 28, 2007 AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper Abstract: I find that municipal bonds trade frequently at rounded prices. Over 13.6% of customer trades in the secondary market are at whole dollar prices. Prices also cluster at halves, quarters, eighths, tenths, etc. Rounding is more prominent in trades that are smaller in size and below par, and in bonds that have larger coupon, lower price volatility and higher trading frequency. All of these characterize bonds that have greater retail interest. Clustering is also prominent in bond yields and dealer's markup, which indicates that customers tend to accept prices without haggling. To explain the pervasiveness and cross-sectional differences in rounding, I model the price formation process in a search-and-bargaining setting in which an informed dealer sells a bond to an uninformed customer. Both search and bargaining are costly. Dealer uses rounding to strategically signal his value and perturb the price. The model shows how dealer's choice of rounding level varies with trade size and buyer's search cost, bargaining cost and bargaining power. Empirically, I show that larger pricing grids are indeed associated with higher transaction cost. In fact, buying at whole dollars costs the customer 45 cents more, and selling at whole dollars costs 25 cents more per $100 par bond. Dealers earn 35% more if they round on both the buy and sell sides.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: Price Clustering, Yield Clustering, Markup Clustering, Dealer's Market Power, Bargaining, Price Resolution, Over-The-Counter Market, Municipal Bond JEL Classification: D40, G14, G24 working papers seriesDate posted: March 17, 2007 ; Last revised: December 23, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.360 seconds