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Citations (6)



Do Governance Mechanisms Matter for Mutual Funds?

Julia Chou

Florida International University

Lilian K. Ng

York University - Schulich School of Business

Qinghai Wang

University of Central Florida - College of Business Administration

March 2007

The paper finds evidence that corporate governance mechanisms matter for mutual funds, especially funds with better governance standards. Using new and unexplored mutual fund governance data, we show that corporate governance mechanisms play a role in both the investment decisions and the monitoring efforts of mutual funds. Mutual funds, in general, tend to tilt their portfolios toward firms with strong corporate governance, and this is more evident in funds with good governance practices. We further find that corporate governance also affects fund proxy voting decisions. Such voting decisions are indicative of the funds' efforts aimed at monitoring corporate activities supporting mutual fund activism. Funds with better governance tend to vote against management's, but consistent with Institutional Shareholder Services' negative recommendations on management-sponsored proposals relating to antitakeover, board quality, and director election. Overall, our evidence suggests that well-governed, while not poorly-governed, mutual funds do perform their fiduciary duties and act in the interests of their shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: proxy voting, Morningstar stewardship grade, mutual funds, governance mechanisms

JEL Classification: G11, G23, G34

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Date posted: March 20, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Chou, Julia and Ng, Lilian K. and Wang, Qinghai, Do Governance Mechanisms Matter for Mutual Funds? (March 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=972235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.972235

Contact Information

Wen-Hsiu Chou
Florida International University ( email )
University Park
11200 SW 8th Street
Miami, FL 33199
United States
Lilian K. Ng (Contact Author)
York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Qinghai Wang
University of Central Florida - College of Business Administration ( email )
PO Box 161400
Orlando, FL 32816
United States
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References:  23
Citations:  6

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