Proxy Voting Brand Competition

Mark Latham


Journal of Investment Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, First Quarter 2007

Institutional and individual investors can coordinate their proxy voting to improve corporate governance. A new funding design for professional proxy advisors can increase their quality and competition. These reforms would reduce the need for the public sector to police boards of directors by onerous regulation and expensive lawsuits.

Keywords: Proxy voting, corporate governance, proxy advisor, individual investor, institutional investor, auditor selection, short-termism, corporate social responsibility

JEL Classification: D72, G34, H4, K22

Not Available For Download

Date posted: April 2, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Latham, Mark, Proxy Voting Brand Competition. Journal of Investment Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, First Quarter 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=972335

Contact Information

Mark Latham (Contact Author)
Votermedia.org ( email )
Vancouver, British Columbia
(604) 608-9779 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://votermedia.org
Feedback to SSRN

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