Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=973831
 
 

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Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt


G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

George G. Triantis


Stanford Law School


University of Cincinnati Law Review, 2007
Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 152

Abstract:     
Although extralegal enforcement is widely acknowledged, the conventional understanding of written contract provisions, such as the complex and detailed provisions in bond contracts, is that they are drafted to be enforced by law. This framing neglects the value of contracts in shaping extralegal forces, particularly where litigation is unlikely or not possible. Sovereign debt contracts provide an example in which lengthy and detailed contracts play a key role even though the debtor is largely litigation-proof. We examine how contract provisions in sovereign debt contracts improve the efficiency of creditor control outside the realm of legal enforcement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

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Date posted: March 26, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Gulati, G. Mitu and Triantis, George G., Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 2007; Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 152. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=973831

Contact Information

Gaurang Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
George G. Triantis
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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