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Earnings Smoothing, Governance and Liquidity: International Evidence


Ryan LaFond


BlackRock

Mark H. Lang


University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Hollis Ashbaugh Skaife


University of Wisconsin, Madison - Department of Accounting and Information Systems

March 2007


Abstract:     
We examine the relation between earnings smoothing, governance and liquidity for a sample of non-U.S. firms. We divide smoothing into innate and discretionary components, and find that discretionary smoothing is increasing in incentives to smooth (greater tax-book conformity, concentrated ownership, related party transactions and weak overall governance) and decreasing in oversight (investor protection, analyst following and ADR listing). Given the potential for smoothing to affect transparency, we examine the relation between smoothing and investors' willingness to transact in the stock as reflected in liquidity. After controlling for other liquidity determinants, we find that firms with greater levels of discretionary smoothing experience lower liquidity as evidenced by greater frequency of zero returns days, lower trading volume and higher bid-ask spreads. In contrast, results for innate smoothing suggest that innate smoothing is positively correlated with liquidity. Taken together, our results suggest that investors differentiate between innate and discretionary smoothing, and discretionary smoothing reduces their willingness to transact in the stock.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: earnings smoothing, earnings management, liquidity, accounting quality, governance

JEL Classification: G15, G32, M41, M43, M47

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Date posted: March 26, 2007  

Suggested Citation

LaFond, Ryan, Lang, Mark H. and Skaife, Hollis Ashbaugh, Earnings Smoothing, Governance and Liquidity: International Evidence (March 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=975232 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.975232

Contact Information

Ryan LaFond (Contact Author)
BlackRock ( email )
400 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
Mark H. Lang
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ( email )
Kenan-Flagler Business School
McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-962-1644 (Phone)
919-962-4727 (Fax)

Hollis Ashbaugh Skaife
University of Wisconsin, Madison - Department of Accounting and Information Systems ( email )
School of Business
975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-263-7979 (Phone)
608-263-0477 (Fax)
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