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Generalized Vickrey Auctions

Hal R. Varian
University of California, Berkeley - School of Information; University of California, Berkeley - Operations and Information Technology Management Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
University of Michigan

1994

Abstract:
We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 07, 2007 ; Last revised: April 07, 2007

Suggested Citation

Varian, Hal R. and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., Generalized Vickrey Auctions (1994). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=975873

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Contact Information

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason (Contact Author) University of Michigan ( email ) 3246B SI North 1075 Beal Ave. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092 United States 734-647-4856 (Phone) 734-764-1555 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jmm/
Hal R. Varian University of California, Berkeley - School of Information ( email ) 102 South Hall Berkeley, CA 94720-4600 United States 510-642-9980 (Phone) 510-642-5814 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/biography.html
University of California, Berkeley - Operations and Information Technology Management Group ( email ) 545 Student Services Building Berkeley, CA 94720 United States 510-643-6388 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 United States