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Economists' Statement on Network Neutrality Policy

William J. Baumol
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies

Martin E. Cave
University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University

Robert E. Litan
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Peter Cramton
University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Robert W. Hahn
University of Manchester; University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Thomas W. Hazlett
George Mason University School of Law

Paul L. Joskow
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Alfred E. Kahn
National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)

John W. Mayo
Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business

Patrick A. Messerlin
Groupe d'Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM Paris)

Bruce M. Owen
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR); Stanford University Public Policy Program

Robert S. Pindyck
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

Scott Wallsten
Technology Policy Institute; Stanford University

Leonard Waverman
London Business School

Lawrence J. White
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Scott Savage
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics


March 2007

AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. RP07-08

Abstract:     
Network neutrality is a policy proposal that would regulate how network providers manage and price the use of their networks. Congress has introduced several bills on network neutrality. Proposed legislation generally would mandate that Internet service providers exercise no control over the content that flows over their lines and would bar providers from charging more for preferentially faster access to the Internet. These proposals must be considered carefully in light of the underlying economics. Our basic concern is that most proposals aimed at implementing net neutrality are likely to do more harm than good.

Keywords: network neutrality, legislation, economics

JEL Classifications: H00

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 28, 2007 ; Last revised: October 07, 2009

Suggested Citation

Baumol, William J., Litan, Robert E., Cave, Martin E., Cramton, Peter C., Hahn, Robert W., Hazlett, Thomas W., Joskow, Paul L., Kahn, Alfred E., Mayo, John W., Messerlin, Patrick A. A., Owen, Bruce M., Pindyck, Robert S., Smith, Vernon L., Wallsten, Scott, Waverman, Leonard, White, Lawrence J. and Savage, Scott, Economists' Statement on Network Neutrality Policy (March 2007). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. RP07-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=976889


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Contact Information

William J. Baumol (Contact Author)
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies ( email )
United States
212-998-8943 (Phone)
212-995-3932 (Fax)
Martin E. Cave
University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )
Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Uxbridge, Middlesex, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
Peter C. Cramton
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-6987 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)
Robert W. Hahn
University of Manchester ( email )
Manchester United Kingdom
University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )
Oxford United Kingdom
Georgetown University
Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Thomas W. Hazlett
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/
Paul L. Joskow
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation ( email )
630 Fifth Avenue
Suite 2550
New York, NY 10111
United States
212-649-1649 (Phone)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
E52-373A
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6664 (Phone)
617-258-7070 (Fax)
Alfred E. Kahn
National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) ( email )
50 Main Street, 14th Floor
White Plains, NY 10606
United States
Robert E. Litan
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ( email )
4801 Rockhill Road
Kansas City, MO 64110
United States
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
John W. Mayo
Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business ( email )
3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
(202) 687-6972 (Phone)
(202) 687-7310 (Fax)
Patrick A. Messerlin
Groupe d'Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM Paris) ( email )
197 Boulevard Saint Germain
197 Bd St Germain Paris 75007 75007
France
Bruce M. Owen
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) ( email )
579 Serra Mall at Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6015
United States
Stanford University Public Policy Program ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Robert S. Pindyck
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
50 Memorial Drive, E52-450
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6641 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Scott Savage
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )
Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303-735-1165 (Phone)
303-492-1112 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://holiday.colorado.edu/savages/
Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )
One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)
Chapman University School of Law ( email )
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
Scott Wallsten
Technology Policy Institute ( email )
1401 Eye St. NW
Suite 505
Washington, DC 20005
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.wallsten.net
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Leonard Waverman
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
Lawrence J. White
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
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