Second-Order Benefits from Standards
University of San Diego School of Law
Boston College Law Review, Vol. 48, p. 169, 2007
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-90
This article contributes to the new governance literature by analyzing how private parties profit from standards. Scholars previously have focused on what I call first-order profits from the right to extract rent directly from the ownership or application of standards. But some parties also make second-order indirect profits by engaging in some new enterprise not directly related to the value of the relevant standard. For example, an accounting firm can offer consulting services based on its reputation as a standard bearer. Second-order profits are most substantial for strong-form standards, which arise when the government designates a private entity as standard setter and assigns it the task of enforcement and regulation. This article suggests that the question of whether such privatization is beneficial depends not only on first-order rents, but also on second-order costs and benefits. It considers two examples from the financial markets: over-the-counter derivatives and credit rating agencies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: CDOs, credit derivatives, credit quality, banks, credit default swap, collateralized debt obligation, risks, moral hazard, disclosure, credit ratings, bankruptcy
JEL Classification: G20, G28, K20, K22, K23, L10, L13, M41, M44Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 29, 2007
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