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A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels
by the U.S. Department of Justice

John M. Connor
Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)




Abstract:     
This paper models a key outcome of secret negotiations: partial-leniency fine discounts from plea bargaining in criminal price-fixing cases. Models tested explain up to 52% of variation in percentage discounts. A minor portion is explained by such defendants characteristics as the defendants rank in queue and delay in settling. Most variation is explained by cartel characteristics. International conspiracies, global cartels, and bid-rigging schemes are granted lower percentage than domestic price-fixing. Discounts were higher in the Bush II than in the Clinton administration. Participants in durable conspiracies are rewarded with larger discounts, but more severe treatment of recidivists cannot be detected.

Keywords: antitrust, cartel, price fixing, deterrence, penalties, fines, discounts, Department of Justice

JEL Classifications: K21, K14, L41, L44, L65, L11, L13, N60

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 06, 2007 ; Last revised: June 09, 2008

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M., A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels by the U.S. Department of Justice. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=977772


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Contact Information

John M. Connor (Contact Author)
Purdue University ( email )
403 W. State St.
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
United States
7654944260 (Phone)
7654949176 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.purdue.edu/staff/facindex.asp
American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
2919 Ellicott Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com
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