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Flexibility Versus Efficiency? A Case Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota Production System


Paul S. Adler


University of Southern California - Management and Organization Department

Barbara Goldoftas


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David I. Levine


University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group


Organization Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 43, 1999

Abstract:     
The relationship between flexibility and efficiency is re-conceptualized. Much organization theory argues that efficiency requires bureaucracy, that bureaucracy impedes flexibility, and that organizations therefore confront a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility. Others have pointed out numerous obstacles to successfully shifting the tradeoff. Seeking to advance understanding of these obstacles and how they might be overcome, an auto assembly plant that appears to be far above average industry performance in both efficiency and flexibility is analyzed. NUMMI, a Toyota subsidiary located in Fremont, California, relied on a highly bureaucratic organization to achieve its high efficiency. Analyzing 2 recent major model changes, it is fond that NUMMI used 4 mechanisms to support its exceptional flexibility/efficiency combination. These mechanisms are discussed.

Keywords: flexibility, bureaucracy, tradeoffs, routines, metaroutines, ambidexterity, switching, partitioning, trust

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 9, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Adler, Paul S., Goldoftas, Barbara and Levine, David I. Ian, Flexibility Versus Efficiency? A Case Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota Production System. Organization Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 43, 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=979102

Contact Information

Paul S. Adler (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Management and Organization Department ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-0728 (Phone)
213-740-3582 (Fax)
Barbara Goldoftas
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
David Ian Levine
University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1697 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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