Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=979393
 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

Footnotes (89)



 


 



The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of Market Power in Standard Setting Organizations


Anne Layne-Farrar


Charles River Associates

Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

Jorge Padilla


Compass Lexecon

April 2007


Abstract:     
RAND commitments — i.e., promises to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms — play a key role in standard setting processes. However, the usefulness of those commitments has recently been questioned. The problem allegedly lies in the absence of a generally agreed test to determine whether a particular license satisfies a RAND commitment. Swanson and Baumol have suggested that the concept of a 'reasonable' royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition. In their opinion, a royalty should be deemed reasonable when it approximates the outcome of an ex ante auction process where IP owners submit RAND commitments coupled with licensing terms and selection to the standard is based on both technological merit and licensing terms. In this paper we investigate whether the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol is likely to deliver efficient outcomes, both from static and dynamic standpoints. We find that given the peculiar characteristics of some of the industries where standardization takes place, in particular the many different business models adopted by innovating companies in those industries, the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol may not always deliver the right outcomes from a social welfare viewpoint.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: RAND, Licensing, Ex Ante Auctions, Reasonable Royalties

JEL Classification: O30, L41, L13, K21

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: April 13, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Layne-Farrar, Anne and Geradin, Damien and Padilla, Jorge, The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of Market Power in Standard Setting Organizations (April 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=979393 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.979393

Contact Information

Anne Layne-Farrar (Contact Author)
Charles River Associates ( email )
1 South Wacker Drive
Suite 3400
Chicago, IL 60606
United States
312-377-9238 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crai.com
Damien Geradin
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Jorge Padilla
Compass Lexecon ( email )
Paseo de Recoletos 7-9
Madrid, 28004
Spain
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,314
Downloads: 446
Download Rank: 36,365
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  89

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.438 seconds