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Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency

Andrei Hagiu
Harvard Business School - Strategy Unit


May 2006

AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 06-12
Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 09-113

Abstract:     
This paper identifies a fundamental economic welfare trade off between two-sided open platforms and two-sided proprietary (closed) platforms connecting consumers and producers. Proprietary platforms create two-sided dead weight losses through monopoly pricing but at the same time, precisely because they set prices in order to maximize profits, they partially internalize two-sided positive indirect network effects and direct competitive effects on the producer side. We show that this can sometimes make proprietary platforms more socially desirable than open platforms, which runs against the common intuition that open platforms are more effcient. By the same token, inter-platform competition may also turn out to be socially undesirable because it may prevent platforms from suffciently internalizing indirect externalities and direct intra-platform competitive effects.

Keywords: Two-Sided Markets, Platforms, Indirect Network Effects, Product Variety, Social Efficiency

JEL Classifications: H00

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 18, 2007 ; Last revised: April 09, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hagiu, Andrei, Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency (May 2006). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 06-12; Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 09-113. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980755


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Contact Information

Andrei Hagiu (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Strategy Unit ( email )
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-496-6745 (Phone)
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