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Aggregation Reversals and the Social Formation of Beliefs

Edward L. Glaeser
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Bruce Sacerdote
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


April 2007

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2134

Abstract:     
In the past two elections, richer people were more likely to vote Republican while richer states were more likely to vote Democratic. This switch is an aggregation reversal, where an individual relationship, like income and Republicanism, is reversed at some level of aggregation. Aggregation reversals can occur when an independent variable impacts an outcome both directly and indirectly through a correlation with beliefs. For example, income increases the desire for low taxes but decreases belief in Republican social causes. If beliefs are learned socially, then aggregation can magnify the connection between the independent variable and beliefs, which can cause an aggregation reversal. We estimate the model's parameters for three examples of aggregation reversals, and show with these parameters that the model predicts the observed reversals.

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Date posted: April 17, 2007 ; Last revised: April 18, 2007

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce, Aggregation Reversals and the Social Formation of Beliefs (April 2007). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2134. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980992


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Contact Information

Edward L. Glaeser (Contact Author)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Room 315A
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2150 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Bruce Sacerdote
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )
6106 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-2121 (Phone)
603-646-2122 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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