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Aggregation Reversals and the Social Formation of Beliefs
Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Bruce Sacerdote Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) April 2007 Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2134 Abstract: In the past two elections, richer people were more likely to vote Republican while richer states were more likely to vote Democratic. This switch is an aggregation reversal, where an individual relationship, like income and Republicanism, is reversed at some level of aggregation. Aggregation reversals can occur when an independent variable impacts an outcome both directly and indirectly through a correlation with beliefs. For example, income increases the desire for low taxes but decreases belief in Republican social causes. If beliefs are learned socially, then aggregation can magnify the connection between the independent variable and beliefs, which can cause an aggregation reversal. We estimate the model's parameters for three examples of aggregation reversals, and show with these parameters that the model predicts the observed reversals. Working Paper Series Date posted: April 17, 2007 ; Last revised: April 18, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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