Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law
Jacob E. Gersen
Supreme Court Review, Vol. 2006, p. 201, 2007
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 161
Congress regularly enacts statutes that share government authority among many political institutions. This paper analyzes how administrative law does and should treat agency statutory interpretation in these overlapping and underlapping jurisdictional schemes. Shared jurisdiction statutes alter the incentives of administrative agencies, and can sometimes be effective tools for managing the principal-agent problems inherent in delegation. Unfortunately, judges regularly employ interpretive practices that undermine, rather than support these regimes. Particularly, in the context of Chevron doctrine - where problems of this sort arise most often - current judicial practices are in tension with the most sensible reconstruction of congressional intent.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: jurisdictional schemesAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 23, 2007
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