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Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices over Time
Craig Doidge University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management George Andrew Karolyi Cornell University - Johnson Graduate School of Management Rene M. Stulz Ohio State University - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) July 2007 Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2007-03-012 ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 173/2007 Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2007-9 Abstract: We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of Congress (SOX) in 2002. We find that cross-listings have been falling on U.S. exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London. This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics rather than by changes in the benefits of cross-listing. We show that, after controlling for firm characteristics, there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on U.S. exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the valuation differential between listed and nonlisted firms (the "cross-listing premium") from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for U.S. exchange listings every year, that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, that it persists when allowing for unobservable firm characteristics, and that there is a permanent premium in event time. In contrast, there is no premium for listings on London's Main Market for any year. Crosslisting in the U.S. leads firms to increase their capital-raising activity at home and abroad while a London listing has no such impact. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms. These benefits have not been seriously eroded by SOX and cannot be replicated through a London listing.
JEL Classifications: F30, G15, G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 25, 2007 ; Last revised: September 17, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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