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http://ssrn.com/abstract=982493
 
 

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Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation


Martijn Cremers


University of Notre Dame

Roberta Romano


Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 23, 2007

Yale ICF Working Paper No. 07-10
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 349
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 83/2007

Abstract:     
This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation adopted by the SEC in 2003, using a paired sample of proposals submitted before and after the rule change. We focus on how voting outcomes relate to institutional ownership and the voting behavior of mutual funds. While voting support for management has decreased over time, there is no evidence that mutual funds' support for management declined after the rule change, as expected by advocates of disclosure. In fact, in the context of management-sponsored proposals on executive equity incentive compensation plans, mutual funds appear to have increased their support for management after the rule change. We also find that this result is not due to changes in compensation plan features, nor that voting outcomes were plausibly related to broker voting, which was eliminated in a parallel 2003 stock exchange rule change. Finally, there is some evidence that firms with greater mutual fund ownership adopt a higher frequency of sponsoring executive equity incentive compensation plans, which could partly explain our findings.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Proxy Voting, Mutual Funds, Institutional Investors, Disclosure

JEL Classification: K22, G34, G28, G38

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Date posted: April 25, 2007 ; Last revised: January 10, 2008

Suggested Citation

Cremers, Martijn and Romano, Roberta, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation (August 23, 2007). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 07-10; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 349; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 83/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=982493

Contact Information

K. J. Martijn Cremers
University of Notre Dame ( email )
P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States
Roberta Romano (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4965 (Phone)
203-432-4871 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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