SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (14)

Beta

 


 



Organizing for Synergies

Wouter Dessein
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Luis Garicano
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Robert Gertner
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


January 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6019

Abstract:     
Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers' authority. Realizing synergies then involves a tradeoff between motivation and coordination. Motivating managers requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive standardization and business-unit managers may misrepresent local market information to limit standardization. As a result, integration may be value-destroying when motivation is sufficiently important. Providing functional managers only with "dotted-line control" (where business-unit managers can block standardization) has limited ability to improve the tradeoff.

Keywords: communication, coordination, incentives, incomplete contracts, merger implementation, organizational design, scope of the firm, task allocation

JEL Classifications: D2, D8, L2

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 08, 2007 ; Last revised: July 13, 2008

Suggested Citation

Dessein, Wouter, Garicano, Luis and Gertner, Robert, Organizing for Synergies (January 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6019. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=984561


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Wouter Dessein (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Luis Garicano
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics ( email )
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2862 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Robert Gertner
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 581
Downloads: 2
Citations: 14

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollob 7 in 1.391 seconds.