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Organizing for Synergies
Wouter Dessein University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Luis Garicano University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Robert Gertner University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) January 2007 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6019 Abstract: Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers' authority. Realizing synergies then involves a tradeoff between motivation and coordination. Motivating managers requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive standardization and business-unit managers may misrepresent local market information to limit standardization. As a result, integration may be value-destroying when motivation is sufficiently important. Providing functional managers only with "dotted-line control" (where business-unit managers can block standardization) has limited ability to improve the tradeoff.
Keywords: communication, coordination, incentives, incomplete contracts, merger implementation, organizational design, scope of the firm, task allocation JEL Classifications: D2, D8, L2 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: May 08, 2007 ; Last revised: July 13, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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