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The Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate Governance: A Comment on Strine

Stephen M. Bainbridge
University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law


May 10, 2007

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-15

Abstract:     
In his essay, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?, Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine seeks to identify common concerns of corporate management, labor, and shareholders. In so doing, Strine endorses a vision of the corporation as "a social institution that, albeit having the ultimate goal of producing profits for stockholders, also durably serves and exemplifies other societal values." Accordingly, he directs our attention to the prospects of creating "a corporate governance structure that better fosters [the corporation's stakeholders'] mutual interest in sustainable economic growth."

There is much that is admirable in Strine's analysis of what ails corporate governance and his proposals for reform, as well as much that is debatable. In this brief comment, I identify three aspects of Strine's analysis that strike me as underdeveloped. First, what do we mean when we call the corporation "a social institution"? Second, do managers and laborers really have common interests threatened by shareholders? Finally, even if Strine's search for common ground is a worthwhile project, is corporate law and governance the appropriate arena in which to find it? Taken together, these issues raise serious questions about the viability of Strine's project.

Keywords: corporation, corporate governance, management, labor, shareholders

JEL Classifications: K22

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 14, 2007 ; Last revised: October 03, 2007

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., The Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate Governance: A Comment on Strine (May 10, 2007). UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985683


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Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
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