Privatisation, Strategic Foreign Direct Investment and the Host Country Welfare

Abstract:     
Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatising their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). In an international mixed oligopoly, we analyse the interaction between privatisation and FDI. We show that privatisation increases the incentive for FDI, which in turn, increases the incentive for privatisation compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatisation depends on the cost difference between the public and the foreign firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry. We show that our results are robust with respect to the incentive contracts between the owners and the managers. The incentive for FDI and is higher under the incentive contract than under the no incentive contract, and the optimal degree of privatisation is almost always higher under the incentive contract than under the no incentive contract.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Privatisation, FDI, Welfare, Incentive contract

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F23, L13, L33

working papers series