Abstract

 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



The Stabilizing Role of Government Size


Javier Andrés


University of Valencia - Department of Economics

Rafael Doménech


University of Valencia - Department of Economic Analysis

Antonio Fatás


INSEAD; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

May 16, 2007

Banco de España Research Paper No. WP-0710

Abstract:     
This paper presents an analysis of how alternative models of the business cycle can replicate the stylized fact that large governments are associated with less volatile economies. Our analysis shows that adding nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to an otherwise standard RBC model can generate a negative correlation between government size and the volatility of output. However, in the model, we find that the stabilizing effect is only due to a composition effect and it is not present when we look at the volatility of private output. Given that empirically we also observe a negative correlation between government size and the volatility of consumption, we modify the model by introducing rule-of-thumb consumers. In this modified version of our initial model we observe that consumption volatility is also reduced when government size increases in similar way to the observed pattern in OECD economies over the last 45 years.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: government size, output volatility, automatic stabilizers

JEL Classification: E32, E52, E63

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 16, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Andrés, Javier, Doménech, Rafael and Fatás, Antonio, The Stabilizing Role of Government Size (May 16, 2007). Banco de España Research Paper No. WP-0710. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=986863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.986863

Contact Information

Javier Andrés (Contact Author)
University of Valencia - Department of Economics ( email )
E-46022 Valencia, Valencia E-46022
Spain
(34 96) 382 8260 (Phone)
(34 96) 382 8249 (Fax)
Rafael Doménech
University of Valencia - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )
Campus de los Naranjos
46022 Valencia
Spain
+96 382 8210 (Phone)
+96 382 8249 (Fax)
Antonio Fatás
INSEAD ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4000 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4242 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.insead.edu/fatas

INSEAD Logo

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 338
Downloads: 53
Download Rank: 169,128
References:  47
Citations:  11

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.328 seconds